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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details  
Report date: 15/07/2011 Accident number: 765 
Accident time: 12:15 Accident Date: 03/12/2009 
Where it occurred: AF0308/01635/5324, 
Qala-e-Ahmad jan 
village, Bagram 
District, Parwan 
Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Inadequate training (?) Secondary cause: Victim inattention (?) 
Class: Handling accident Date of main report: 09/12/2009 
ID original source: None Name of source: Demining group 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: VOG-17, 30mm rifle 
grenade 
Ground condition: soft 
wet 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 15/07/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
mechanical follow-up (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
 
Accident report 
The demining group made available the details of this accident in 2011. Its conversion into a 
DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is 
editorial. The report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
[Letter] 
1 
Dear all,  
Today the 3rd December at 12.15 pm [Demining group] had an incident at one of our 
minefields in Bagram, Parwan Province, Afghanistan (Central). The incident happened at a 
[Demining group] site where this particular clearance section is funded by [Name removed]. 
The [Name removed] sections are working under the auspice of [Demining group]’s 
accreditation and SOPs. 
There was one casualty, but I am glad to say that the deminer concerned, [Name removed] 
did not lose his life, at present he is undergoing surgery at a hospital in Kabul. The hospital’s 
diagnosis is that he may loose his leg below the knee at present, there were no other 
members of his section injured. 
Initial investigation by Afghanistan Mine Action Centre (AMAC Central) and [Demining group], 
has  been carried out this evening however, I must mention that the deminer breached all 
standard safety and security procedures according to [Demining group]’s SOPs. 
A further investigation will be carried out over the next couple of days and a detailed report 
will be sent Sunday the 6th December 2009.    
[Demining group] Operations Manager in country has notified [Name removed]’s family. 
Best Regards, [Name removed], Programme Coordinator HQ 
 
[Demining group] / [Funder] 
Detailed Demining Incident Report 
From: [Demining group] / [Donor group]  
Date report submitted: 09 Dec 2009  
To: Mine Action Co-ordination Centre for Afghanistan (MACCA) 
References: 
A. Demining Accident Report (copy attached). 
B. Afghanistan Mine Action Standards (AMAS). 
C. [Demining group] SOPs. 
 
Part one – background (This is a summary of information from the initial Demining incident 
report) 
1. Demining organisation name: [Demining group/Donor group] 
2. Organisation sub unit, team name/number: Clearance Section # 80  
3. Name of worksite supervisor: Group Supervisor, [Name removed] ([Name removed], was 
acting group Supervisor) at the time of the accident. Section leader, [Name removed] 
4. Location of incident; (province, district, village, minefield number). 
Parwan Province, Bagram District, Qala-e-Ahmad jan village, MF # AF0308/01635/5324. 
5. Date and time of incident: 03 Dec 2009 and time 12:15 PM 
6. Type of incident: Demining Accident 
Part two - Demining Accident details of incident:  
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The accident occurred at 12:15, approximately 15 minutes after a short break of (10 min). 
According to the section leader, one of the deminers [Name removed] was working in his 
clearance lane, located approximately 80m south east of TP-1 in the centre of the MF. 
The deminer found one mortar type- 62mm High Explosive with fuse, according to the section 
Leader the fuse had an actual fuse cover and was safe to handle. The DM reported to the 
Section Leader, the Section Leader then reported to the Group Supervisor about the UXO 
found. The Section Leader did a visual check to see if the UXO was safe to move. 
The deminer was instructed by his Section Leader to move the UXO and place the item 
concerned in the demolition pit, which was located 21 metres away from the deminer’s 
working area / lane. On the way to the demolition pit the deminer accidentally dropped the 
UXO and according to the Section Leader, the deminer dropped the UXO directly on to stone 
that was in the ground and subsequently the UXO detonated.  Timings for the accident were 
recorded as follows: 
12:15hrs Accident occurred. 
12:17hrs SL, Paramedic & one Deminer reach the accident point.  
12:18hrs Accident reported to JMAS Radio Room by Section leader. 
12:25hrs Initial first aid applied at the accident site & casualty evacuated to the ambulance 
pick up point. 
12:27hrs Casualty was loaded into Ambulance & stabilised for 2min. 
12:28hrs Ambulance departs for Kabul Emergency hospital.  
12:30hrs AMAC Central Area informed by [Demining group] Field Officer.  
13:20hrs the External Accident Investigation Team (AMAC) arrives on site. 
13:41hrs Ambulance Arrives Kabul Emergency hospital, patient re-irrigated & wounds re-
dressed. 
14:20hrs Internal [Demining group] Investigation team arrives on site. 
09:00hrs AM IMSMA Demining Accident Report delivered to AMAC Central (one day after). 
Part three – incident site conditions  
7. Conditions on the incident site at the time of the incident in terms of worksite layout and 
marking, ground and terrain, vegetation and weather were as follows: 
a. Worksite layout and marking. The incident location was seven metres away from the 
deminer’s clearance lane. The area around the accident is a cleared area. Markings of the 
clearance lane were as per [Demining group] SOPs & AMAS. The Section Leader’s location 
was approximately 30m away when the accident occurred. The ambulance pick up point was 
approximately 20m away. A sketch map is located at Annex A, in the Demining Accident 
Report. [Not made available.] 
b. Ground and terrain. Soil at the site was sandy & wet from heavy rain from the day before. 
The terrain is mainly flat. And it was also noted that the ground was heavily contaminated with 
AP mines and scattered ordnance.  
c. Vegetation. Vegetation in the area is desert type vegetation. It did not have any 
involvement in causing the accident.  
d. Weather. Temperature was approximately +8°C. This is not believed to have played any 
part in causing the accident. 
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9. Photographs of the site, damaged equipment and patient are at Annex B. 
Part four – team and task details  
9. Team details. The [Demining group] Clearance Section (CS) comprises one SL, one 
Paramedic, 4 Deminers / Operator and one Driver. All members are qualified under [Demining 
group] training courses. The EOD 2 (160mm) course was conducted in October 2009; 
refresher training is conducted every Friday during mission periods. Retraining is also 
conducted after significant leave periods as per AMAS. Retraining & Friday refresher details 
are at Annex C. Two external and two internal conformity reports were received during the 
period from 01 November to 03 Dec 2009. The team and the individual concerned appear to 
have been working normally in the lead up to the accident. All members involved were trained 
according to [Demining group] SOPs. 
10. Task details. The [Demining group] Clearance section was assigned the task from 07 April 
2009 as per first quarter operation plan year 1388. The team had been working 3 days of the 
mission in the MF. The area to be cleared is 57335sqm, 54076sqm had been cleared from 07 
April 09. 219 PMN-2 types mine and 67 UXO had been found during that period. The Site 
operations plan is at Annex D. No problems had been reported during the task. And 
preparation area was by MDU Mini mine wolf (54091sqm) and destroyed AP mines by MMW 
(625).  
11. Copies of the IMSMA Task Data Sheet, Internal & External conformity reports and 
Progress report are at Annex E.  
Part five – Equipment and procedures used 
12. Equipment used. The accident occurred whilst carrying an item of unidentified UXO, 
however Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) (vest & visor) was being worn at the time.  
13. Procedures used. The procedures relevant to this accident are contained in [Demining 
group] (Afghanistan) Demining and EOD-SOP as following Chapters: 
Demining SOP Chapter - 4.3 Identification: 
When a positive identification has been made, a correct method of disposal is to be 
determined and the appropriate precautions are to be undertaken accordingly. If no positive 
identification can be made, the demolition is not to proceed and further advice is to be sought 
from the EOD Officer or Technical Advisor.  
EOD SOP Chapter - 5.4.2. Demolition Procedure: 
If any UXO needs be moved to a better position for demolitions, a pulling drill method must be 
used.  
 
Demining SOP Chapter - 4.1 Informing the Team Leader: 
When an object is uncovered it is to be confirmed as being a mine or UXO, the team leader 
must be informed immediately. 
The team leader / section leader with protective equipment, are then to approach the object 
and decide on the appropriate action. 
14. Work routines. The team was following the standard 8 hour work routine and had been 
working approximately 5 hours 35 minutes when the accident occurred. The [Demining group] 
Daily working schedule for December 2009 is at Annex F.   
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 Part six – Explosive hazards involved 
15. Details of the UXO involved in the incident are as follows: 
a. As per the IMSMA Progress report dated 03/12/2009 one UXO had been located in the 
clearance lane.  
b. Details of the crater size. Diameter Approx 80cm, Depth Approx 20cm, fragments was 
found in close proximity to the incident site by team members.  No other UXO or mines are 
located in the immediate area of the clearance lane where the incident occurred.  
Part Seven – Details of injuries  
16. Details of the person injured in the incident and their injuries are as follows: 
Name: [Name removed] 
Occupation: Deminer/operator 
Date of Birth: 1984 – 25 Years of age; 
Place of Birth: Balkh province, Afghanistan; 
Blood Group: O Rh +  
Injuries:  
The patient has direct blast injuries below the knee on the right leg. 
Bad Fractures, (Shattered) of the Tibia and Fibula bones. 
The patient was conscious and his vital signs were normal. 
The [Demining group] accident report detailing medical treatment is attached at Annex G.  
 
Part eight – Equipment/property/infrastructure damage  
17. The following equipment was damaged during accident: Visor, Personal Protective 
Equipment  
For property and infrastructure provide details of the owner(s), damage incurred, insurance 
held by the owner(s) and if known, the cost of restitution or repair.  
18. PPE. Details of all PPE damaged as a result of the incident are as follows: 
a. Owner; [Demining group], Description; Visor, Damage; Blast in to fragments, Value; $120. 
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b. Owner; [Demining group], Description; Uniform, Damage: Blast / Frag damage, Value $40.  
c. Owner; [Demining group], Description; PPE, Damage: Blast / Frag Damage, Value $600. 
19. Copy of the initial Demining accident report IMSMA, Annex H [Not made available]. 
 
Part nine – Medical and emergency support  
20. The medical support was as per [Demining group] SOPs. The Paramedic from CS- was 
located approximately 100m from the accident site and the Ambulance was 180m. The pick 
up point was located 20m from the accident site. Communications was by VHF radio and 
mobile phone between the team, Site office & [Demining group] HQ. The last MEDEVAC drill 
was conducted on 01.12.09. Drills are conducted at least once during every mission period.  
21. Medical and emergency response was effective and as per [Demining group] SOPs. 
 
 
[The Victim being treated in the field.] 
  
Part ten – Reporting procedures 
22. The initial incident reporting procedures were carried out to a good standard, the initial 
report relayed to the Central area (AMAC) verbally by phone within 15 min and written report 
submitted within 18 hours. 
 
Part eleven – Any other matters of relevance.  
23. No other matters of relevance. 
 
Part twelve – Discussion, conclusions and recommendations 
24. Provide any additional discussion, conclusions and recommendations.  
Conclusion 
We believe the accident was attributed to an error on behalf of the section leader, in that the 
wrong identification of this particular UXO was made.  
The investigation team could not find any signs of fragments of a mortar. No mortar tail or fins 
were found in the vacinity of the accident. The fragments that were found were from a 
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(FIRED) VOG-17-30mm grenade, this particular grenade has a self destruct mechanism. 
(See attached drawings), Annex- I [not made available]. 
The accident area at the time of accident was wet, soft and sandy, there were no stones 
visible in the area, as the Section Leader previously mentioned the deminer may have 
dropped the UXO (mortar) on a stone, this is highly unlikely, as the fragmentation found in the 
crater were found to be fragments from the fore mentioned VOG 17 self destruct grenade. 
 
Recommendations 
[Demining group] SOP clearly defines that when a UXO is found that is unidentifiable, it 
should be blown in situ or hook & lined, then pulled to the area required, in this case the 
demolition pit. 
The fact that it was identified as a 62 mm HE mortar, shows us that we need to provide re-
training for the particular clearance section, not to mention the Team Leader, to identify 
different types of UXO, also the actions that should be taken after the correct identification is 
made. 
We also recommend that retraining is given to all [Demining group] Clearance Sections, to 
ensure the error is understood and this type of accident is not repeated. 
Demining refresher training was undertaken on Friday 4th December; also EOD refresh 
training was conducted on 8th December included in this training was hook and line 
procedures, ordnance recognition and the dangers associated with the VOG 17 grenade, 
including movement and transportation of the same. See Annex J, Refresher Training Plan. 
The Section Leader responsible in this accident should be relieved from his position 
immediately. This particular Section Leader was involved in the last 3 accidents with 
[Demining group]. It clearly shows that he is not capable as a Section Leader and can not 
control his deminers and his procedures are incorrect. 
25. Internal investigation team members: 
[Name removed] Head of Operations 
[Name removed], Senior Technical Advisor 
[Name removed] Field officer Central 
[Name removed] [Demining group] Operation officer 
[Name removed], IDT Office 
[Name removed] Head of Operations, [Demining group] Afghanistan 
 
Annexes: [all except photographs, not made available] 
Annex A - Sketch map of task and location of accident.  
Annex B- Photographs of the site, damaged equipments and patient. 
Annex C- Friday refresher plans. 
Annex D - Site clearance plan.  
Annex E - Copies of the IMSMA Task Data Sheet, Internal & External conformity reports, and 
Progress report.  
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Annex F - Team daily working schedule for Dec 2009. 
Annex G - Medical treatment with injured. 
Annex H- Copy of the initial Demining accident report IMSMA. 
Annex I -  Pictures of a VOG 17 Self Destruct Grenade. 
Annex J - Refresher Training Plan.  
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 951 Name: [Name removed] 
Age: 25 Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: 86 minutes 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron; Long 
visor 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: severe Leg 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "Bad Fractures, (Shattered) of the Tibia 
and Fibula bones". 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as Inadequate training because the Victim and his 
supervisor did not know the difference between a rifle grenade and a mortar. The VOG-17 is 
a 30mm rifle grenade and could not readily be confused with a mortar by anyone with any 
knowledge of ordnance. This implies that the training had been entirely inadequate. 
It is not clear why the grenade exploded, although the injury implies that it exploded on the 
ground and beside the Victim’s leg. It seems that the Victim must have dropped the grenade, 
so the secondary cause is listed as Victim inattention. 
The accident occurred seven metres from the Victim’s working lane, so within the safety 
distance for the threats, but the investigators were photographed at the site without wearing 
PPE. This sets a regrettably common example of double standards. 
The demining group which made the report available is to be applauded for its transparency 
and for the actions it took to prevent a repetition of the errors that led to the accident. 
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